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Abstract If being around smart people makes us smarter and more productive,
what can regions do to attract smart people? This paper considers endogenous
cultural amenities as a location factor for high-skilled workers. To overcome
selection in the provision of cultural amenities, we exploit variation in contempo-
raneous cultural amenities that is explained by the path-dependence of historical
agglomerations of the cultural activities. To assess spillovers from high-skilled
& Stephan Heblich
stephan.heblich@bristol.ac.uk
Oliver Falck
falck@ifo.de
Michael Fritsch
m.fritsch@uni-jena.de
Anne Otto
anne.otto@iab.de
1 Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, University of Munich, Poschingerstr. 5,
81679 Munich, Germany
2 Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich (LMU), Munich, Germany
3 CESifo, Munich, Germany
4 School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Jena, Carl-Zeiss-Str. 3,
07743 Jena, Germany
5 Halle Insitute for Economic Research (IWH), Halle (Saale), Germany
6 Department of Economics, University of Bristol, Priory Road Complex, Priory Road,
Bristol BS8 1TU, UK
7 IZA, Bonn, Germany
8 Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany
9 IAB Rheinland-Pfalz-Saarland, Eschberger Weg 68, 66121 Saarbru¨cken, Germany
123
J Cult Econ
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10824-017-9310-4
workers attracted by cultural amenities, we use a 1% sample drawn from the
population of all West German workers under social security during the period
1975–2010. This panel of individual observations allows us to compare wages of
similar individuals who work in locations with different levels of high-skilled
workers who are attracted by cultural amenities. To account for non-random
selection of workers among cities, we use individual-location fixed effects. Our
results show that cultural amenities are an important factor in the location decision
of high-skilled workers. The positive effect of the local share of high-skilled
workers on unskilled, skilled and high-skilled wages indicates strong and productive
spillovers.
Keywords High-skilled workers  Location factor  Productive spillovers  Cultural
amenities
JEL Classification R23  J30  I26  H41
1 Introduction
It is well accepted that being around smart people makes us smarter and more
innovative (cf. Lucas 1988). By clustering geographically, innovators can foster each
other’s creative spirit, learn from each other and become overall more productive.1
This implies that once a city attracts some innovative workers and companies, its
economy may change in ways that make it even more attractive to other innovators.
This multiplier effect is one explanation for self-enforcing agglomeration economies.
From a policy perspective, there are two approaches to attract innovative workers
that may jump start self-enforcing agglomeration economies. Demand-side
approaches aim at attracting firms by direct or indirect subsidies with the hope
that workers will follow (‘‘people follow jobs’’). Supply-side approaches pursue the
reverse direction and focus on attracting workers with consumption amenities that
contribute to the city’s quality of life, with the hope that firms will follow (‘‘jobs
follow people’’). While there is an increasing literature on place-based policies for
firms, we know comparatively little about place-based policies for workers.2
However, Moretti (2012) expresses doubts about the effectiveness of supply-side
policies and references the example of Berlin, a city that managed to become the
world’s coolest city with only one problem: there are not enough jobs.
This paper analyses how differences in the local supply of cultural amenities
affect the share of high-skilled workers who generate productive spillovers that
benefit other individuals in the same local labor market. We use a 36-year panel of
individual wage data from the German social insurance records. The data allow us
to distinguish low, medium-and high-skilled workers who are nested in 325 West
German districts (NUTS-3 regions) and we exploit the panel structure of our data to
1 For a recent summary of this extensive literature, see Carlino and Kerr (2014).
2 See Neumark and Simpson (2014) for an extensive overview of place-based policies.
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absorb individual characteristics as potential drivers of non-random selection of
workers among locations (Combes et al. 2008; Glaeser and Mare 2001).
The main challenge relates to a chicken-and-egg problem: Does the existence of
amenities attract high-skilled workers or does the supply of cultural amenities
follow high-skilled workers, spurred by their willingness and ability to pay for such
amenities (Diamond 2016; Shapiro 2006). To solve this endogeneity, we draw on a
quasi-natural experiment in German history to explain the emergence of historical
agglomerations of cultural activities which remained highly persistent until today.
This path-dependence leaves us with a historically determined shifter of the regional
share of high-skilled workers who value the cultural scene.
Our results suggest that high-skilled workers are attracted by cultural amenities
and all skill groups in a location benefit from the agglomeration of high-skilled
workers. In our preferred specification, a 1% point increase in the share of high-
skilled workers causes low-skilled workers’ wages to increase by 1.4%; skilled
workers’ wages increase by 1.6%; and high-skilled workers enjoy 1.1% higher
wages. This finding is in line with survey evidence for Germany. The McKinsey
survey Perspektive Deutschland finds that high-skilled movers name ‘‘cultural
offerings and an interesting cultural scene’’ among the top five reasons (out of 15
possible reasons) for their location choice (cf. Buettner and Janeba 2016).
Our paper contributes to a stream of literature in public economics discussing
whether cultural amenities like theaters or opera houses should be considered public
goods that are financed by tax-payers’ money. One of the first and most prominent
arguments in support of the public aspect of cultural goods is developed in Baumol
and Bowen (1966), who assign an existence value to cultural amenities that even
matters to those individuals who never intend to actually use the amenity (see also
Throsby 1994). They argue that cultural amenities benefit the community as a
whole, justifying thus the provision of public money. Our results provide empirical
evidence for this argument. Our findings further connect to an established literature
on the effects of amenities and quality of life on the spatial distribution of economic
activities starting with Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982). Kahn and Walsh (2015)
provide a comprehensive overview of this literature. Finally, our analysis relates to a
strand of literature that examines spillovers from high-skilled workers (cf. Moretti
2004, Glaeser and Mare 2001).
In the following, Sect. 2 will provide a more detailed discussion of the historic
argument underlying our instrument. Section 3 lays out the empirical strategy, and
Sect. 4 introduces our data. We present our results in Sect. 5 and discuss their
robustness in Sect. 5. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes with policy implications and an
outlook to future research.
2 Historical agglomerations of the cultural activities in Germany
The Peace of Westphalia ended the 30 years’ War in the Holy Roman Empire of the
German Nation in 1648. Part of the treaty was a concept of coexiting sovereign
states. As a result, we observe a heavily fragmented political landscape with
numerous kingdoms, princedoms and dukedoms that continued to exist until the
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German Empire was established in the second half of the nineteenth century. During
this period, many of the local rulers competed for prestige and aimed at imitating
the French court. As a result, they spent enormous amounts of money to make their
local courts glamorous. With musical performances becoming more and more
popular at many local courts in fragmented Germany, competition for composers of
music started increasing and made the region an attractive place for musicians (Elias
1993). The increased demand for musicians and musical innovations is reflected in a
large number of famous composers of the baroque era who came from politically
fragmented areas in Germany or equally fragmented areas in Italy (Scherer 2001;
Vaubel 2005).3
An opera performance at court was a particularly glamorous and prestigious
spectacle that was supposed to demonstrate the glory and the power of the ruler.
Such performances were single events that normally took place in the court’s
premises with admission restricted to the members of the court and some invited
nobles (Raynor 1972).4 Since they have in no way been part of everyday life they
cannot be considered as early cultural concentrations that could predict today’s
distribution of cultural amenities. In some places, however, the rulers’ enthusiasm
for operas became so strong that they constructed a special opera house. This was a
significant commitment to the musical arts, involving the permanent maintenance of
an orchestra and singers, stage designers, costume designers, and so forth. With a
dedicated opera house, performances were no longer single events for a restricted
audience but became regular and much more frequent—one could rent a seat for the
season—and they were opened to the general public spreading this type of artistic
culture among the population. Only a part of the people involved in opera
performances—often singers and musicians—had a contract for a longer period of
time that was not always well paid. Many contributions were made on a freelance
basis often as a supplement to one’s regular occupation (e.g., architects as stage
designers).5 Many of the professional artists, particularly those who worked more or
less on a freelance basis, developed all kinds of cultural activities in order to earn
additional income to support their living. In this way, singers and musicians often
spread their abilities as music teachers. As a result, the presence of a stand-alone
opera house in the baroque era marked the nucleus of a wide range of cultural
activities in the respective location.
These findings suggest that the initial stimulus for building opera houses in the
baroque period resulted from the cultural competition between kings, dukes, and
princes at a time when strategic marriages and war alliances instead of economic
factors determined regional prosperity. Of course, one could argue that the funds
needed to build a prestigious opera house did not just magically appear but must
have been, at least to some degree, based in the region’s economic status. However,
as discussed by Duchhardt (2007) and Vierhaus (1984), the theory that you can only
3 Among these composers were Johann Sebastian Bach, Georg Friedrich Handel, Georg Philipp
Telemann, Joseph Haydn, Christoph Willibald Gluck, Ludwig van Beethoven, Wolfgang Amadeus
Mozart, and Antonio Vivaldi.
4 Helm (1960) gives a detailed description of such events at the courts of Frederik the Great in Berlin and
Potsdam.
5 Generally, the members of the choir were amateurs coming from all kinds of professions.
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spend what you have was not a popular one among the absolutistic rulers of this era.
Indeed, it was not uncommon for rulers to incur huge debts and engage in deficit
spending in their quest for grandeur. Furthermore, it was general practice to sell
subjects as mercenaries to foreign sovereigns in order to improve public finances
(Loewenstein 2001).
Figure 1 maps the locations of the 29 stand-alone opera houses in Germany built
before 1800 (cf. Falck et al. 2011). Interestingly, all of these opera houses still
operate today, some of those were destroyed by fires or during war times having
been rebuilt afterward. The map clearly shows that the baroque opera houses were
not located solely in today’s big cities such as Berlin, Munich, or Hamburg, but also
in several smaller towns such as Bautzen, Neustrelitz, Weimar, Passau, or Stralsund.
Many of these smaller courts were petty princedoms that could hardly afford
expensive opera performances but nevertheless committed themselves to this type
of artistic culture.6 These cases clearly demonstrate that setting up an opera house at
that time was rather independent of economic wealth. Instead, it was driven by
baroque ruler’s idiosyncratic preferences.
Under the assumption of agglomeration economies in the production of cultural
goods, we would expect historical agglomerations of cultural activities to be highly
path-dependent. In support of this assumption, Table 1, Panel A, shows a simple
comparison of cultural activities in locations with a baroque opera house and
locations with an opera house that was built after the baroque era. Overall, we
observe 92 opera houses today in Germany, 29 of which can be traced back to the
baroque era (cf. Zo¨chling 1983). To measure cultural activities, we exploit detailed
information from social insurance records and a special social insurance for
freelance artists (cf. Haak 2005), and calculate the number of artists per 1000
inhabitants on the German district level as an average over the years 2002–2007.
Together, these two data sources allow us to draw a comprehensive picture of
locations’ cultural amenities today, which, among other things, led us to observe
significantly higher shares of artists in baroque opera house locations. Interestingly,
these differences are not restricted to those types of artists that are typically
employed in opera houses, such as singers and musicians. They include a wide
range of artists and thus truly support our argument that baroque opera houses
initiated a diverse cultural scene that is still present today. Further support for our
argument is provided in the last row of Table 1, where we exploit information from
the 1907 census (Statistik des Deutschen Reichs 1909a, b). Here, we find
information on the number of workers engaged in creative businesses. Using these
data, we compare the employment share of artists in 1907 across the same two types
of locations. Again, we find a significantly higher share of artists in baroque opera
house locations, thus underlining the time persistence of these early cultural
concentrations.
We finally compare public expenditure for different categories between baroque
opera house locations and other opera house locations. If our argument was true, we
6 Fischer-Dieskau (2006) gives a lively and detailed description of the development of opera
performances around 1800 in the city of Weimar. At that time, Weimar was the small capital of the
rather poor and petty dukedom of Saxe-Weimar that, however, became one of the leading centers for arts
in nineteenth century Germany.
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should indeed see differences between public expenditure for culture but not for
other categories. Table 1, Panel B, shows public expenditure in 2004 for the
categories ‘‘Theater, Concerts and Cultivation of Music,’’ ‘‘Sports Facilities,
Fig. 1 Locations of baroque opera houses in Germany. Notes: The map shows the 29 baroque opera
house locations in Germany
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Swimming Pools, and other Recreational Facilities,’’ and ‘‘Popular Education.’’7 In
line with our expectations, we see a significant difference for the category ‘‘Theater,
Concerts, and Cultivation of Music,’’ but not for the other categories.
3 Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy is based on a simple theoretical framework outlined in
Moretti (2004). The spatial equilibrium approach considers two representative
locations, A and B, and two types of workers, low-skilled and high-skilled. If
Table 1 Comparison between baroque opera house locations and other opera house location
Baroque opera
house location
Other opera
house location
Difference (1)–(2)
[p value]
Panel A: Artists per 1000 inhabitants 2002–2007 or 1907
Freelance artists, writing 2.639 1.660 0.979
(0.481) (0.226) [0.019]
Freelance artists, acting 1.181 0.748 0.433
(0.178) (0.088) [0.008]
Freelance artists, music 2.802 1.826 0.976
(0.288) (0.165) [0.001]
Freelance artists, graphic arts 3.846 2.457 1.389
(0.484) (0.275) [0.005]
Freelance artists, all 10.468 6.691 3.777
(1.334) (0.699) [0.004]
Employed artists subject to social insurance 6.697 5.074 1.623
(0.586) (0.438) [0.018]
Artists in 1907 2.389 1.573 0.816
(0.561) (0.253) [0.065]
Panel B: Public spending in Euro per inhabitant, 2004
Theater, concerts and cultivation of
music
100.19 69.47 30.72
(12.05) (6.50) [0.008]
Sports facilities, swimming pools, and
other recreational facilities
46.12 48.48 - 2.36
(3.57) (2.97) [0.681]
Popular education 19.47 21.04 - 1.57
(2.50) (1.55) [0.708]
Number of observations 29 63 –
The table shows means and standard errors for different measures of local artists per 1000 inhabitants
(Panel A) and public spending in Euro on amenities (Panel B) in 29 baroque opera house locations
(column 1) and 63 locations where the opera house was built after the baroque era (column 2). Column 3
shows the difference (diff) between column 1 and column 2 along with the p value of Ho: diff\ 0. The
share of artists in 1907 is measured per 1000 workers
7 The underlying data were supplied by the statistical offices of the German states. They are part of a
report on the 2004 municipal budgets.
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location A increases its spending on cultural amenities and thus becomes more
attractive for high-skilled workers, the relative share of high-skilled workers
increases in location A. Standard demand and supply considerations suggest that an
increasing supply of high-skilled workers has a negative effect on high-skilled
workers’ wages, while unskilled workers’ wages increase if we assume comple-
mentarity between high- and low-skilled workers. If we additionally allow for
productive spillovers from high-skilled workers, we still expect a strictly positive
effect on low-skilled workers’ wages. For high-skilled workers, the direction of the
effect depends on the strength of the spillover; if spillovers overcompensate the
negative supply effect, we would observe a wage increase, otherwise a decrease. In
equilibrium, workers are indifferent between location A and B, since higher rents in
the relatively more attractive location A will equalize real wages. The higher real
wage earned in location B thus acts as compensating differential for the lower level
of amenities. Any observed differences in nominal wages point to productivity
advantages that firms must obtain to offset paying higher wages. Without
productivity gains, producers of tradable goods would relocate to locations with
lower wages. This condition holds as long as every location hosts some firms
producing traded goods and as long as workers are free to move between tradable
and non-tradable sectors (Moretti 2012).
Since we are interested in productive spillovers from high-skilled workers that
value cultural amenities, we have to look at nominal wage differences across
locations with different shares of high-skilled workers. Specifically, in our empirical
model, we extend the specification in Moretti (2004) and estimate individual wage
regressions for three skill levels (high, medium, low). For a given skill group the
wage regression is of the form:
ln wiltð Þ ¼ b1hslt þ X0itb2s þ X0ltb3 þ ali þ at þ eilt ð1Þ
where ln wiltð Þ is the natural logarithm of the nominal wage of individual i with a
given skill level working in location l at time t. The coefficient of interest is b1, the
effect of the share of high-skilled workers (hslt) on the skill group’s wages. Xit is a
vector of time-variant individual controls including nationality (since workers may
become German over time), experience, experience2, industry or occupation con-
trols, and interactions between experience/experience2 and gender/nationality as
suggested in Beaudry et al. (2012). Xlt are time-variant location characteristics that
may be correlated with hslt and the dependent variable. Specifically, we include log
population to account for general agglomeration effects and the labor force par-
ticipation rate as proxy for changes in labor demand. ali is a set of individual-
location fixed effects, which implies that identification of the coefficient of interest
does not come from movers but from stayers who experience different shares of
high-skilled workers over time. Finally, at is a set of year dummies for 1975–2010
which capture such factors as wage increases compensating for inflation. eilt is an
error term clustered on the individual-location level.
To focus on the effect of high-skilled workers who are attracted by cultural
amenities, we introduce a first-stage relationship that links the location’s share of
high-skilled workers to the exogenous spatial distribution of baroque opera houses.
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Strictly speaking, this is a reduced form of two stages: The first stage relates today’s
local cultural amenities to the exogenous emergence of a baroque opera house in the
past; the second stage relates access to today’s cultural amenities to the local share
of high-skilled workers.
In this reduced form specification, we cannot rule out that high-skilled workers
are attracted by the built heritage (Backman and Nilsson 2016) of a baroque opera
house (and the historic city center) and not the historical agglomeration of cultural
activities that is present at baroque opera locations. However, the descriptive
statistics in Table 1 show that baroque opera house locations are home to a rich
cultural scene today and the same is true for 1907. We cautiously interpret this
persistence as evidence in support of our argument that baroque opera houses
stimulated the agglomeration of cultural activities. In unreported robustness tests
(for details, we refer to Falck et al. 2015a), we further show that conditioning our
regressions on the existence of monasteries—one specific type of built heritage—
does not change our results. In summary, this makes us confident that the effect of
baroque opera houses on high-skilled workers mainly works through the agglom-
eration of cultural activities today.
Since the effect of cultural amenities like an opera house is not restricted to a
location itself but may also benefit surrounding locations, we use the minimum
distance from each location l to the closest baroque opera house as instrument. The
underlying logic is that being closer to a baroque opera house location means better
access to cultural amenities, which is particular attractive for high-skilled workers.
In the robustness test in Sect. 6, we will also present an alternative specification
where we only consider a dummy variable that indicates baroque opera house
locations. Our first-stage regression of the share of high-skilled workers on the
minimum distance to the next baroque opera house location takes for a given skill
group the following form:
hslt ¼
X36
t¼2
d1ltdistl þ X0iltd2 þ X0ltd3 þ lil þ lt þ xilt ð2Þ
Here, hslt represents the share of high-skilled workers in a first-stage regression
for individuals i of the given skill group at location l and at time t. The coefficients
of interest are d1lt, which give us the time-variant effect of distance to the closest
baroque opera house (distl) over the period 1976–2010.
8 1975 is the base category.
We estimate time-variant effects d1slt for two reasons: First, cultural amenities as
one contribution to a district’s quality of life might have gained increasing
importance over our 36-year observation period (Rappaport 2009). Second, the
existence of a baroque opera house might have kick-started a cumulative process of
attracting high-skilled workers, that is, high-skilled workers were initially attracted
by the closeness to a baroque opera house; further high-skilled workers followed
expecting higher wages due to human capital spillovers. Note that these spillovers
are not necessarily limited to the opera house location, but may also come from
8 In unreported specifications, we replace distance with a baroque opera house dummy (see Falck et al.
2015b). We find qualitatively similar results.
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high-skilled workers in surrounding locations that are also close to a baroque opera
house. The main effect of distance is captured in the location-individual fixed
effects. The remaining control variables are the same as the ones employed in
Eq. (1).
Our instrumental variable strategy thus identifies the effect of changes in the
local share of high-skilled workers on non-mobile workers at the same location.
Changes in the share of high-skilled workers come from mobile high-skilled
workers who are either directly attracted by the proximity to cultural amenities or
indirectly by other culturally disposed mobile high-skilled workers.
The key requirement on our instrument is that it affects individual wages only
through the assumed channel as location factor for high-skilled worker but not
through any direct channel. As discussed in Sect. 2, we argue that baroque rulers’
decision to build an opera house was purely idiosyncratic and not determined by any
regional location factors that may affect funding. The competing argument would be
that only rich rulers could afford to build an opera house and the same factors that
contributed to the rulers’ wealth in the past may still determine regional prosperity
today. To the extent that these location factors are completely time-invariant, our
fixed effects will absorb them. However, one remaining concern can be that past
location factors may affect future outcomes by causing a movement from one
equilibrium state to another. This transition would create path dependencies that are
not captured by fixed effects (Nunn 2009). In the robustness checks, we will explore
the assumed randomness of the baroque opera house locations in more detail, by
checking whether observable historic location factors can explain the existence of a
baroque opera house.
4 Wage data 1975–2010
Our data stem from the Historic Employment and Establishment Statistics (HES)
database (cf. Bender et al. 2000, for a detailed description). The administrative
origin of HES implies that the data are restricted to information relevant for social
insurance purposes. This includes information on daily wages, a range of socio-
demographic variables (such as educational attainment, gender, and age) and the
industry, occupation, and place of work for all German workers subject to social
insurance. To be represented in the HES, individuals must be subject to Germany’s
social security system. As a result, civil servants and self-employed individuals are
not included in our database. We further choose to exclude workers younger than 18
or older than 65. Finally, we exclude all individuals in training and in part-time jobs
since there is no information on hours worked in the HES.
There is no information for East Germany prior to 1990. After 1990, East
Germany is a special case, since qualifications from the former GDR were
sometimes formally no longer valid or knowledge and experience diminished in
value (cf. Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Izem 2012; Burda and Hunt 2001). Consequently,
we are not sure what types of spillovers to expect from high-skilled workers and
thus focus in our main specifications on West Germany excluding Berlin, since we
cannot distinguish between East and West Berlin in our data. In doing so, we can
J Cult Econ
123
also exploit our exceptionally long-time series from 1975 to 2010. Workers in West
Germany are nested in 325 West German districts (NUTS-3 regions)—our spatial
level of analysis.
The wage information is very reliable, since it is used to determine social
insurance contributions, but wages are censored due to the limit for compulsory
social insurance payments. To deal with this, we use Gartner’s (2005) procedure to
impute the truncated distribution. The educational attainment of workers is
differentiated into three categories: low-skilled (workers without vocational
training), medium-skilled (with vocational training), and high-skilled (workers
with a degree from a university or a university of applied sciences).
In the period from 1975 to 2010, we can follow more than 53 million West
German full-time employed workers in the age group between 18 and 65 throughout
their working lives. However, to reduce the computational burden, we restrict our
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Period Period Period
1975–1991 1992–1999 2000–2010
Variables on the individual level
Log wage high-skilled workers 4.136
(0.403)
4.588
(0.394)
4.748
(0.448)
Log wage skilled workers 3.753
(0.460)
4.190
(0.459)
4.340
(0.496)
Log wage unskilled workers 3.422
(0.565)
3.817
(0.586)
3.984
(0.583)
Experience (years) 19.57
(12.23)
20.29
(11.52)
22.85
(11.07)
Female (%) 36.95 40.00 42.68
Foreign (%) 9.11 9.17 7.73
Manufacturing (%) 42.09 35.99 30.38
Variables on the district level
Population (in TSD) 378.06
(368.11)
381.09
(363.45)
387.86
(373.86)
Labor force participation rate (%) (workers/population) 31.00
(11.17)
29.90
(10.45)
27.60
(10.00)
Share high-skilled workers (%) 4.61
(2.70)
7.17
(3.83)
9.89
(5.06)
Avg. distance to the next baroque opera house (km) (distance
measured from the district centroid)
51.31
(33.84)
Avg. distance to the next baroque opera house (km) (distance
measured from the district’s population center)
50.77
(35.14)
Number of districts 325 325 325
The table shows the mean of all variables. Individual-level variables refer to all full-time employed West
German workers in the age group from 18 to 65. District-level variables refer to the 325 West German
districts in their 2009 boundaries. Standard deviations of continuous variables are in parenthesis
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analysis to a 1% random sample. Our random sample thus consists of 530,624
workers who spent their working lives in West Germany and who were at least once
recorded as full-time workers during this 36-year period. Descriptive statistics for
our West German random sample are provided in Table 2.
We complement the individual worker information with district-level informa-
tion on the share of high-skilled workers, our treatment variable, on population size
in order to account for time-variant general agglomeration effects, and on the labor
force participation rate calculated as the share of workers in the overall population
as a control for cyclical changes in the local labor market that may simultaneously
affect the share of high-skilled workers and wages.
Finally, we use information on 19 stand-alone baroque opera houses in West
Germany (excluding Berlin). We geocode the address of each of these opera houses
and use this information to calculate the distance to all 325 West German districts,
using both the district’s centroid and today’s population center as reference point.9
Centroid and the population center are both located within the district-polygons and
they are correlated by 0.965. The average distance of all West German districts to
the closest baroque opera house across all West Germany is 53.5 km (based on the
district’s centroid), meaning that cultural amenities at the baroque opera house
location tend to be within a reasonable travel distance. Figure 2 shows kernel
density estimates for distance to the centroid or population center. Small differences
between the two measures may occur if redrawing districts’ boundaries has induced
an uneven population distribution across space or generated irregular shapes. We
will use distance to the centroid in our baseline specifications and show alternative
specifications using distance to the population center in our robustness checks.
5 Results
This section discusses our baseline results, looks at effect heterogeneity, and finally
contests the validity of our instrumental variable. For additional robustness tests that
contest the validity of our approach, we refer the interested reader to Falck et al.
(2015b), Sect. 6.
5.1 Baseline
Figure 3a illustrates the first-stage relationship for the specification with high-
skilled workers as a dependent variable in the second stage. As we can see, distance
to the next baroque opera house has the expected sign in all years—the share of
high-skilled workers increases as distance to the next baroque opera house
decreases—and the 95% confidence interval around the point estimates shows that
the relationship is persistently different from zero in all years after 1982. F-tests of
the joint significance of the instruments formally support the visual impression that
we are dealing with strong instruments. The absolute rise of the distance coefficient
9 We used Google Earth and the Corine Land Cover database to determine each district’s population
center.
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clearly corroborates our arguments of an increasing importance of cultural amenities
as one determinant of quality of life of high-skilled workers and of the cumulative
process of attracting high-skilled workers initiated by the closeness to a baroque
opera house.
Tables 3, 4, and 5 present the results of our wage estimations for high-skilled
(Table 3), medium-skilled (Table 4), and low-skilled (Table 5) workers. In column
I, we present a specification without instrumenting the share of high-skilled
workers. This corresponds to Eq. (1). In columns II–VI, we instrument the share of
0
.0
05
.0
1
.0
15
0 50 100 150 200
Distance to the next baroque opera house in km
Distance to Population Center
Distance to Geographic Centroid
Fig. 2 Kernel density of distance to the next opera house in West Germany. Notes: The figures show
kernel density plots of the all distances between (1) districts’ population center (solid line) and (2)
countries’ centroids (dashed line) to the closes West German baroque opera house. Excluding West
Berlin, we observe 19 baroque opera houses across West Germany. The vertical line represents both the
mean minimum distance to the population center of 53.3 km as well as to the centroid of 53.5 km. The
two are not distinguishable from each other in the figure
Fig. 3 First-stage relationship. a Distance to the closest opera house, b opera house dummy. Notes: The
figure is a graphic representation of the time-variant coefficients from the first-stage regression in Eq. (2)
with 1975 as base year. Panel a shows coefficients on the interactions between the minimum distance to
the next opera house and year dummies and panel b shows coefficients of interactions between opera
house dummies and year dummies. Each coefficient shows the expected relative percentage point increase
in the share of high-skilled workers when moving 1 km closer to a baroque opera house location. This
specification considers the subset of high-skilled workers. Coefficients are enclosed by 95% confidence
band. Standard errors are corrected for individual-district clustering
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high-skilled workers with the distance to the next baroque opera house as specified
in Eq. (2). The results of the first-stage regression are omitted from the tables, but
Fig. 1 illustrates the size and significance of the first-stage relationship throughout
the specifications. The Anderson Rubin F statistics and the Kleibergen Paap F
statistic both suggest that weak instruments are not a major concern in our
estimations. In column II, we present the instrumental variable regression without
individual controls, district-level controls, or year dummies. We only condition on
individual-location fixed effects, a dummy variable indicating whether we imputed
the wage or not and whether the individual is working full time in this year or not. In
column III, we add time dummies and individual time-variant controls including
interactions between gender/nationality and experience to allow for differential
effects for females or foreigners. We also include interactions between the
individual controls and the censoring dummy. In column IV, we include ten one-
digit industry controls and again interact them with the censoring dummy, and in
column V we include district-level controls. Finally, column VI presents a
specification where we replace the industry controls with one-digit occupation
controls.
Our preferred specification is in column V, where we consider the full set of
individual and district controls and one-digit industry controls. Our results suggest
that a 1% point increase in the share of high-skilled workers increases high-skilled
workers’ wages by 1.1%, medium-skilled workers’ wages by 1.6%, and low-skilled
workers’ wages by 1.4%. As predicted by the theory underlying our estimations, the
effect is positive for the two less-educated groups, which indeed should experience
a strictly positive effect. Since we also observe a positive effect on high-skilled
workers’ wages, we conclude that spillovers form high-skilled workers exceed the
negative supply effect. Since recent literature has shown that spillovers are highly
localized (Ahlfeldt et al. 2015) we interpret these findings as combined effect of
localized spillovers on the district level.
The estimated coefficients are qualitatively comparable to the effects reported by
Moretti (2004) for the USA. He finds that a 1% point increase in the share of college
graduates raises high school dropouts’ wages by 1.9%, high school graduates’
wages by 1.6%, and college graduates’ wages by 0.4%. However, our effect on the
low-skilled workers is somewhat lower than Moretti’s effect for the high school
dropouts. The reason for this might be that our group of low-skilled workers
primarily consists of workers without a basic degree from secondary school while
Moretti looks at workers who have at least attended high school for some time.
Furthermore, we find a stronger effect for high-skilled workers than Moretti does for
college graduates. The reason for this might be that we observe a particularly
interesting group of high-skilled workers—those who value cultural amenities and
who are willing to move to be close to them. These workers might generate
especially productive spillovers for other high-skilled workers. By contrast, Moretti
looks at college graduates in general or college graduates who are immobile (in the
land grant college specification) since they also work at the college location. To
further quantify the wage effects, we relate our estimates to the 2005 average wages
of the three skill groups. We find that the average high-skilled worker, who earns
€39,457 per year, would earn an extra €434.03 if the share of high-skilled workers in
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the local labor market increases by 1% point. The average medium-skilled worker,
who earns €30,295, would earn an extra €484.72, and the average low-skilled
worker, with an income of €21,189, would earn an additional €296.65.
5.2 Effect heterogeneity
We will now explore the effect heterogeneity and show that our results are robust to
a number of sample splits. The results of all exercises are summarized in Table 6.
The three different columns represent estimation results for high-skilled (column 1),
medium-skilled (column 2), and low-skilled (column 3) workers. Each line includes
the result from a different model and each cell stands for a separate regression.
We start with subsample estimations for female and male workers, as well as
manufacturing workers. In these estimations, we look at different subsamples of
recipients of the spillovers, while the source of spillovers, high-skilled workers,
remains unchanged. While the overall results do not change qualitatively, one
interesting finding is that spillovers on females are in general stronger than on
males. Looking at manufacturing versus non-manufacturing industries, we find even
stronger effects for our three skill groups. This is important because manufacturing
industries are typically producers of tradable goods which would relocate to
locations with lower wages if higher nominal wages did not imply productivity
advantages. Finally, we split the sample into below/above mean distance to the
closest baroque opera house. The idea behind this sample split is that we should see
effects for districts located close enough to a cultural center so that one can, e.g.,
attend an evening performance. The mean distance to the closest baroque opera is
53.5 km. Thus, districts with a below mean distance to the closest baroque opera
house are in travel distance. Reassuringly, we find that our effects especially come
from the short-distance sample.
5.3 Instrument validity
To explore the randomness of the baroque opera house locations,10 we try to
identify historic twin locations of the baroque opera house locations. Twin locations
did not receive a baroque opera house, but had the same initial probability of having
one given a large set of observable historic location factors. The idea to identify
twin locations reflects our assumption that having a baroque opera house is the
result of a baroque ruler’s idiosyncratic preferences. To exploit our search for twins,
or counterfactual baroque opera house locations, we calculate the distance to the
closest counterfactual baroque opera house location and check whether closeness to
a counterfactual baroque opera house location can predict the share of high-skilled
workers in a district. If this was the case, one may argue that factors other than the
existence of a baroque opera house drive our results.
We consider a large number of historic district characteristics to determine
historical twins of the opera house locations. Differences in rulers’ wealth are the
most obvious reason why some regions got an opera house while others did not.
10 For a critical discussion of the instrument validity, see also Bauer et al. (2015) and Falck et al. (2015a).
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Factors that may have contributed to a places’ wealth were the availability of
mineral deposits, agricultural productivity, the size of the state, degree of
urbanization, access to the coast or large rivers, existence of a historic university,
and free, Hanseatic or imperial city status. Beyond that, we may think that the
rulers’ religious determination may have influenced the decision to build an opera
house, with religion affecting educational attainment and subsequent economic
development (Becker and Woessmann 2009).
To proxy for these location factors, we use a combination of current and historic
information. Specifically, we account for the percentage of land that is located on
coal, ore, quartzite, or slate deposits as proxy for mineral deposits. To proxy
agricultural productivity, we rely on the Food and Agricultural Organization’s (FAO)
Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) 2002 dataset and choose the suitability for
cereal (rain-fed at moderate input) or pasture as in Nunn and Qian (2011); the size of
the principality (out of 99) and the log of its population in 1700 according to Bairoch
et al. (1988); the cumulative population in all ‘Bairoch’ cities within today’s district
borders in 1700 and the population growth between 1700 and 1800, access to the
coast and cumulative kilometers of large rivers within today’s district boundaries; the
Table 6 Effect heterogeneity
I II III
High-skilled workers
Baseline: 1.053***
Skilled workers
Baseline: 1.563***
Unskilled workers
Baseline: 1.364***
Female 1.706* 1.863*** 1.417***
(0.976) (0.266) (0.495)
Male 0.824** 1.337*** 1.307***
(0.354) (0.152) (0.355)
Manufacturing 1.629*** 1.732*** 1.221***
(0.55) (0.249) (0.459)
Non-manufacturing 0.989** 1.434*** 0.799**
(0.436) (0.175) (0.404)
Above mean distance - 0.002 1.194*** - 0.369
(1.045) (0.382) (0.743)
Below mean distance 0.874*** 1.939*** 2.166***
(0.285) (0.113) (0.230)
Each cell presents the result from a separate regression. The independent variable is the share of high-
skilled workers and the dependent variable is the log of the daily wage of high-skilled workers (column
1), skilled workers (column 2), and low-skilled workers (column 3). We instrument the share of high-
skilled workers in a region with the minimum distance to the next baroque opera house interacted with
year dummies. Individual controls include foreign, experience, experience2, censored wage dummy, time
dummy, interactions of experience with female and foreign, and interactions of the censoring dummy
with individual controls. Industry controls are dummies for ten one-digit industries. District-level controls
include log population and the labor force participation rate. If not otherwise stated standard errors are
corrected for individual-location clustering
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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existence of a historic university (Eulenburg 1904); free, Hanseatic or imperial city
status; the principalities’ religious determination (Shepherd 1923).
Using these location factors, we perform a propensity score matching and
determine the nearest neighbor of each actual opera house location. To determine
the propensity score, we estimate a probit model of having a baroque opera house
using historic location factors plus the district size today (in km2) and an indicator
for city district as explanatory variables. Based on the predicted probabilities, we
determine a counterfactual opera house location with the closest predicted
probability to receive an opera house. This is the nearest neighbor of each actual
opera house location predicted on the base of the observable historic location factors
discussed above.
Table 7 shows the pairs of actual and counterfactual opera house locations along
with the predicted probabilities (columns 2 and 4) and the difference in the
predicted probabilities (column 5). As we can see, we find relatively close twins for
all actual baroque opera house locations. However, for seven actual baroque opera
house locations, we find the city district of Mainz to be the best twin.11
We now calculate the minimum distance of all districts to these counterfactual
baroque opera house locations and use this distance to instrument the share of high-
skilled workers in the wage regressions. Figure 4 shows the first-stage relationship
over time between distance to closest counterfactual baroque opera house and the
share of high-skilled workers as compared to the relationship between distance to
closest actual baroque opera house and the share of high-skilled workers. The
figure reveals that distance to the closest counterfactual opera house location has
hardly any predictive power. This finding supports the validity of our instruments.
6 Conclusions
Our results suggest that ‘‘music in the air’’ does indeed pay off for a location. We
exploit comprehensive individual-level panel data over a long period of 36 years
and find that high-skilled workers who are attracted to locations with a rich and
diverse cultural scene generate productive knowledge spillovers. Importantly, these
knowledge spillovers do not just benefit other high-skilled workers but also lower-
skilled workers. Our paper thus highlights an important channel through which the
overall minor direct contribution of a cultural scene to the local economy is
leveraged: a rich cultural scene attracts high-skilled workers; the agglomeration of
high-skilled workers generates productive knowledge spillovers that in turn benefit
all workers in a region.
From our first-stage regressions, we further see that proximity to cultural
amenities—here measured as distance to the next baroque opera house—becomes
increasingly important during the observation period of 36 years. This finding
provides an interesting perspective on regional location factors. In the past, physical
capital and infrastructure were probably the best predictors for a location’s
economic success. With the shift from manufacturing goods to the more knowledge-
11 We show in Falck et al. (2015b) that omitting those seven locations does not affect our results.
J Cult Econ
123
intensive production of innovation, factors that increase a location’s quality of live
and help attract innovative people have gained increasing importance. In this paper,
we cannot separate this increasing amenity effect from a cumulative effect where
innovative workers who value a location’s quality of live attract more innovative
workers. However, in both cases, variation in the share of high-skilled workers
across locations (initially) comes from cultural amenities. We can thus isolate the
effect of culture on the agglomeration of high-skilled workers and their productive
spillovers.
From a policy perspective, our findings clearly raise the question whether
investing in cultural amenities is a promising place-based policy. The answer is
twofold. On the one hand, our results suggest that economic activities can benefit
from the presence of consumption amenities, in our case a proxy for the existence of
Table 7 Predicted probabilities using historic location factors
Opera house
location
Predicted
probability (1)
Counterfactual
location
Predicted
probability (3)
Difference
(1)–(3)
Munich 0.7894 Mainz 0.8425 - 0.0531
Coburg 0.2841 Memmingen 0.3120 - 0.0279
Luebeck 0.4762 Emden 0.5017 - 0.0255
Muenster 0.5379 Stuttgart 0.5447 - 0.0068
Mannheim 0.3234 Bielefeld 0.3300 - 0.0066
Trier 0.4466 Nuremberg 0.4490 - 0.0024
Aachen 0.0110 Herford 0.0125 - 0.0015
Passau 0.2129 Straubing 0.2139 - 0.0010
Brunswick 0.2547 Duesseldorf 0.2540 0.0007
Augsburg 0.0762 Krefeld 0.0751 0.0011
Wuerzburg 0.3363 Bielefeld 0.3300 0.0063
Darmstadt 0.4557 Nuremberg 0.4490 0.0066
Frankfurt 0.8497 Mainz 0.8425 0.0072
Bayreuth 0.2731 Duesseldorf 0.2540 0.0191
Ulm 0.8954 Mainz 0.8425 0.0528
Regensburg 0.9209 Mainz 0.8425 0.0784
Koblenz 0.9719 Mainz 0.8425 0.1293
Bremen 0.9760 Mainz 0.8425 0.1334
Hamburg 0.9800 Mainz 0.8425 0.1375
The table shows pairs of 19 actual and counterfactual opera house locations in West Germany. Coun-
terfactual opera house locations result from a Mahalanobis matching on the predicted probabilities from
probit estimations of the baroque opera house dummy on the area of today‘s district; an independent city
status dummy; log of slope measured as difference between the highest and lowest elevation; the log of
the area of the historic principality that covers the most of today’s district; the log of the historic
population in 1700 and the population growth between 1700 and 1800 in all Bairoch cities within the
district today; the log of river-km in the district; a coast dummy; a dummy if the location was home to a
university before 1800; Hanseatic city status dummy; free city status dummy; percent of the area that
contains coal, ore, quartzite, and/or slate; soil’s suitability for cereal and pasture at medium input; and an
indicator for the dominant religion. Column (5) shows the difference between the predicted probability
for the actual and counterfactual opera house
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cultural amenities. This may explain why local spending on culture is hotly debated
among local policymakers. For ‘‘cool’’ places like Berlin, this further suggests that
there is hope that jobs will follow people.
On the other hand, we advise caution, since our analysis focuses on regions that
benefit from an increasing share of high-skilled labor. If the overall supply of high-
skilled workers is constant, this would imply a beggar-thy-neighbor policy: one
region’s gain in high-skilled employment means a loss to another region. To end up
with an overall positive welfare effect, the positive effect of the knowledge
spillovers must therefore be larger in the gaining regions than the diseconomies in
the losing regions. Evaluating the overall welfare impact is beyond the scope of this
paper and we thus refer it to future research.
The relevance of our distance instrument further suggests that locations can
benefit from cultural amenities in neighboring locations. Instead of investing in own
cultural amenities, local policymakers might thus choose to free-ride. Since we do
not explicitly look at the financing side of cultural amenities, we cannot contribute
to answering the question of how one could solve this coordination problem.
Instead, we again refer this to further research.
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